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FOREWORD 
It i s  known that the classical Walmsian titonnement i s  neither viable nor nec- 
essarily asymptotically stable. This failure can be overcome, one can find a way 
to get out of this impasse of the orthodot economic theory, if we agree to perform 
some modifications of the mathematical tmnslation of the basic ideas and to change 
the questions, as we shall ezplain in  this paper. 
Instead of starting with a supply and demand law such as the Walmsian t i ton- 
nement, even though it a g g q a t e s  sensible individual behaviors, even though it is so 
seducing - prices goes up when demand ezceeds supply and go down when supply 
ezceeds demand - to be ubelieved" in,  we propose to start with the actual behavior 
of consumers among which scarce resources have to  be allocated and derive what are 
the supply and demand laws which allow an allocation decentmlized by the prices. 
The supply and demand law is no longer a primitive of the model, but a conclusion, 
in  a sense made precise later: the supply and demand law shall emerge from the 
confrontation of the diverse wishes of the consumers and the scarcity of available 
commodities. 
The nezt problem we ezamine is then to select among such supply and demand 
laws compatible with the scarcity of constraints the ones which satisfy supplementary 
requirements. W e  shall suggest io  chose the ones which satisfy the inertia principle, 
i n  the sense that prices evolve only when scarcity i s  at stakes. 
Decentralized Ecodynamics: 
An Alternative View 
Jean-Pierre Aubin & Jean Cartelier 
1 The Issues 
We shall devote this proposal to the simplest economic problem we can think 
of: 
how to allocate scarce resources among consumers 
by complying to the basic economic constraint 
It is impossible to consume more physical goods than available 
In other words, let us introduce the set of allocations of these scarce 
resources among the consumers. If M denotes the set of scarce resources, 
then the set of allocations of scarce commodities to n consumers1. is the set 
n 
K of z = (21,. . .,z.) satisfying y = E z ;  E M 
;=1 
This means that each consumer receives a commodity the sum of which 
is viable in the sense that the total consumptions is an available resource. 
This problem looks at first glance somewhat silly and simple minded, 
since it amounts to  pick up an element in this allocation set (i.e., to choose 
an allocation) in the case of static models, or to evolve in this set, regarded 
as a viability set, in the case dynamical systems. However, it elucidates the 
basic difficulties characteristic of economic theory, which has to  explain the 
viability of allocation mechanisms, from "dictatorial" mechanisms where a 
planning bureau computes and imposes an allocation to  more sophisticated 
'"Exchange economiesn are the particular case when M := (0) is reduced to 0 or 
M := -R!+ is the negative orthant. In thie case, z denotes the net exchange. For such 
exchange economies, viability theorems are trivial. 
mechanisms ("social rules" imposed by institutions) involving decentraliza- 
tion of decisions through prices, shortages, taxes, etc. which allows con- 
sumers to  choose freely and independently their commodities in such a way 
that the scarcity of constraints is satisfied. 
In the framework of a an allocation model decentralized by prices (and 
only by prices), our ambition is to present a mathematical metaphor of a 
mechanism for which one can characterize what are all the "supply and de- 
mand laws" regulating the evolution of prices which allow continuous trans- 
actions of consumers in a decentralized way. The fact that in a stationary 
environment such mechanisms converge to  an equilibrium (stationary al- 
location) is an independent issue which is not the one which is primarily 
addressed, even though it became the main criterion of economic relevance. 
Indeed, static models assign one or several elements in the allocation set. 
But it may be time to  answer the wish J. von Neumann and 0. Morgenstern 
expressed in 1944 at the end of the first chapter of their monograph "Theory 
of Games and Economic Behavior": 
"Our theory is thoroughly static. A dynamic theory would unquestionably 
be more complete and therefore, prefemble ..." 
"Our static theory specifies equilibria ... A dynamic theory, when one is 
found - will probably describe the changes in terms of simpler concepts." 
We study here some mechanisms which govern the evolution of allocations 
of scarce resources2. In these dynamical models, the laws which govern the 
evolution of allocations are most often represented by differential equations 
(or differential inclusions) with or without memory (functional differential 
inclusions). 
Static models are particular cases of (time-independent) dynamical mod- 
els yielding "constant evolutionsn, which are also called "equilibrian. By the 
way, the concept of equilibrium often covers two different meanings in eco- 
nomics: 
1. The first one, the meaning we use in these lectures, is derived from 
mechanics, where an equilibrium is a constant evolution, or a "rest 
pointn of an underlying dynamical system. In this case, equilibrium 
means stationarity. 
'By the way, in dynamical models, we can aeeume that the subset of allocations evolves 
with time, and may also depend upon the history of the evolution. In this paper, the 
set M of allocations is assumed to remain constant, i.e., resources are not depleted by 
consumption. 
When a solution of a dynamical system converges asymptotically to  a 
limit, this limit is an equilibrium. The question arised conversely to 
obtain an equilibrium which is asymptotically stable, i.e., an equilibrium 
which is obtained as a limit of the solutions to  the dynamical process 
starting nearby. 
2. The second meaning is covered here by what we call the viability con- 
straints, such as the total consumption must be less than or equal to 
the total supply, etc. 
Stationarity - the first meaning of equilibrium - cannot be an issue 
whenever the behavior of consumers evolve with time and whenever the set of 
scare resources can be depleted by consumption or enlarged by production, 
technological advances and so on. These are reasons which led some of us 
to abandon such stationarity requirements. 
However, in a time independent environment, stationarity may describe 
an aspect of satisfaction: when satisfied, no one has any reason to change 
the situation. But even homo oeconomicus may be frustrated most of the 
time3. 
But viability constraints - even fiduciary ones - cannot be violated, 
and we have to  devise evolutionary models which provide consumption paths 
which respect them at each instant. 
This is then the first issue which is dealt with by viability theory: find 
evolutions which obey at each instant the scarcity constraints. A second 
issue is, in a time independent environment, to  prove whether among these 
solution one can find equilibria. A third issue is then to  know whether some 
of these equilibria are asymptotically stable. 
It is known that the classical Walrasian tftonnement is neither viable 
nor necessarily asymptotically stable: For some of them, there may exist an 
equilibrium, even unique, which is not asymptotically stable. This failure 
can be overcome, one can find a way to get out of this impasse, if we agree 
to perform some modifications of the mathematical translation of the basic 
ideas and to  change the questions, as we shall explain now. 
Instead of starting with a supply and demand law such as the Walrasian 
tftonnement, even though it aggregates sensible individual behaviors, even 
though it is so seducing - prices goes up when demand exceeds supply and 
go down when supply exceeds demand - to  be "believedn in, we propose to 
'If homo oeconomicus is not born at equilibrium - and thus, eternally happy - he 
only reaches blissfulness when he dies at very old - infinite - age! 
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start with the actual behavior of consumers among which scarce resources 
have to  be allocated and derive what are the supply and demand laws which 
allow an allocation decentralized by the prices. The supply and demand 
law is no longer a primitive of the model, but a conclusion, in a sense made 
precise later: the supply and demand law shall emerge from the confronta- 
tion of the diverse wishes of the consumers and the scarcity of available 
commodities. 
The next problem is then to select among such supply and demand laws 
compatible with the scarcity of constraints the ones which satisfy supple- 
mentary requirements. We shall suggest to  chose the ones which satisfy 
the inertia principle, in the sense that prices evolve only when scarcity is a t  
stakes. 
2 Decentralization 
2.1 Centralized and decentralized mechanisms 
We begin by distinguishing between centralized and decentralized models. In 
the first category of models, consumers delegate their decision power to  
another "agent" who, knowing the behaviors of the consumers and the set 
of scarce resources, solves the problem a t  the global level. 
For instance, consumers must agree to  describe their behavior by a col- 
lective utility function 
Then, this agent (planning bureau, big computers or big brothers, ...) 
knowing U and the subset M,  decides to  maximize U over the allocation set 
n 
K: Find an allocation f = ( f  1,. . . , f,) such that xii E M and 
i=l 
U(fl , .  . . , f n )  = max U(Z,, . . . , zn) Cy=l 2iEM 
The problem is then transferred to the question of choosing the collective 
utility function U. 
Or, in the dynarnical version, they agree t o  represent their behavior by, 
say, a system of differential equations 
where the variations of the consumption of each agent depend upon the 
knowledge of both the whole set of scarce resources and the choices of every 
other agents. Nagumo's Theorem - the first viability theorem for ordinary 
differential equations published in German in 1943, and thus, forgotten and 
rediscovered a t  least fourteen times - provides necessary and sufficient con- 
ditions for the dynamics hi to provide solutions to this system of differential 
equations satisfying the viability condition 
Such necessary and sufficient conditions can be regarded as "social" rules 
imposed on the consumers for respecting the scarcity conditions. Actually, 
there are many dynamical systems satisfying such rules4. 
In both cases, we deal with centralized models. 
In a decentralized mechanism, the information on the problem is split and 
mediated by, say, a "message" which summarizes part of the information. In 
our case, we use the "price" p as a main example of message. Knowing the 
price p, consumers are supposed to know how to choose their consumption 
bundle, without 
knowing the behavior of their fellow consumers 
knowing the set of scarce resources 
Then the problem is to find what is the message which carries the relevant 
information. 
Actually, we have to  ask whether it is possible to find such a relevant 
message and then, how to find it. 
If it is possible to answer the first type of question, it is much more 
difficult to investigate the second, leaving such problems to mythical players 
such as Adam Smith's "invisible hand", etc. We shall bethink that these 
players are not really operating on the price system, which we shall propose 
'which, for exchange economies, take the form 
so that there are as many mechanisms than ways to allocate 0 in the form of velocities of 
consumers. 
t o  regard as a regulatory control (a  'regulee") t o  help the consumers t o  
respect the scarcity constraints by delivering them proper informations on 
the behavior of all consumers and the set of available resources. 
There are many other decentralized models, such as 'rationing" mecha- 
nisms which involve shortages (and lines), or 'frustration" of consumers, or 
'monetary" mechanisms, or others. 
Naturally, there is no 'pure" decentralization, since the choice of the 
decentralization message is in some sense centralized. The prices help con- 
sumer t o  make their choice in a decentralized way, but the difficulty is post- 
poned to  explain the evolution of price. 
Decentralization has a meaning in the context of a hierarchical organi- 
zation in two levels (at least). Furthermore, one can conceive 'cascades" of 
decentralization mechanisms using several kinds of messages (prices, quan- 
tities, lines or queues, advertisement, rumors, etc.) at each level of more 
complex hierarchical organizations in Russian dolls or Chinese boxes. At 
each level, an adequate class of messages allows us t o  decentralize the level 
below through a specific 'institution". Hierarchical decentralization allows 
t o  hide the ultimate difficulties for the explanation of the evolution of the 
messages of the upper level. 
We shall proceed from now on by considering the mechanism of decen- 
tralization by prices only. This is the context in which Adam Smith, LQn 
Walras, Kenneth Arrow, Gdrard Debreu and many others designed their 
contribution. 
2.2 Adam Smith's Invisible Hand 
Indeed, there is no doubt that Adam Smith is a t  the origin of what we now 
call decentralization, i-e., the ability for a complex system moved by different 
actions in pursuit of different objectives t o  achieve an allocation of scarce 
resources5. The difficulty to  grasp such a disordered way of regulation of 
economic processes, contrary to  apparently more logical (or simple minded?) 
attractive organizational processes based on several varieties of planning 
procedures6 led him to  express i t  in a poetic manner. Let us quote the 
'With his compatriot David Hume, one can say that he is also at the origin of cybernet- 
ics and that he deeply influenced Charles Darwin. This is this cybernetical tradition that 
we chose to pursue here. In chapter 7 of his most famow book, he proposes an explicit 
dynamical proceas which is viable in spirit because transactions among agents are carried 
out at every step, contrary to the Walrasian titonnement. 
"in favor among military organizational schemes. 
celebrated quotation of his book AN INQUIRY INTO T H E  NATURE AND T H E  
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS published in 1776, two centuries ago: 
uEvery individual endeavours to employ his capital so that its produce 
may be of gmtest  value. He genernlly neither intends to promote the public 
intewst, nor knows how much he is promoting it. He intends only his oum 
security, only his own gain. And he is in this led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention. By pursuing his oum 
intewst, he frequently thus promotes that of society mow eflectually that 
when he really intends to promote it" 
We had to  wait a century more for L b n  Walras, a former engineer, 
t o  propose that this invisible hand "operates" on economic agents through 
prices, gaining enough information on the desires of the agents and the 
available commodities for guaranteeing their consistency, or the viability of 
the allocation system. 
He presented in 1874 the general equilibrium concept in E L ~ M E N T S  
D ' ~ C O N O M I E  POLITIQUE P U R E  as a solution to  a system of nonlinear equa- 
tions. At that time, when only linear systems were understood, the fact that 
the number of equations was equal t o  the number of unknowns led him and 
his immediate followers to  make the optimistic assumption that a solution 
should necessary exist7. 
2.3 Walras' Choice 
In modern terms, the behavior of each consumer is described by a demand 
function d;(p, r) associating to  a price p and an income r  the ith consumption 
z; = d;(p,  r )  of Mrs. i .  A demand function subsumes a passive way to  
choose automatically a commodity knowing the price and the income, in 
the sense that a dynamical system describes rather an active way, in which 
the consumers changes his consumption and thus, acting on the system, 
becoming an economic agent in the real sense of the word. 
This is a decentralized mechanism, since Mrs. i ignores the behavior of 
her fellow consumers and the size and the nature of the set M of scarce 
resources. 
A price p associates linearly with any commodity y its value denoted 
' ~ u t  it took another century, until 1954, for Kenneth Arrow and GCrard Debreu to 
find a mathematical solution to this problem. This solution, however, could not have been 
obtained without the fundamental Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem in 1910, which in turn 
required much modification to tailor it to this specific problem - by proving theorems 
whose assumptions could bear the same degree of economic interpretation as the conclusion. 
by (p, y) (expressed in numbers of monetary units). It thus associates with 
the set M of available commodities its total income uM(p) := S U P , , ~ ~ ( P ,  y), 
which is the largest value of the available commodities y of M at  price p. 
In Walrasian economies, i t  is assumed that this total income is allocated 
among consumers. Each consumer receives a share ti(p) of the total income 
Once such an income allocation among consumers is made, Mrs. i 
chooses the commodity z; = d;(p, ti(p)) knowing only the price p. The 
problem is then to  find a price jj (the Walrasian equilibrium price) such that 
(dl@ tl(jj)), . . . , dn(jj, rn(p))) forms an allocation. 
This is a decentralized model because consumers do not need to know nei- 
ther the choices of other consumers nor the set M of available commodities. 
The basic Arrow-Debreu Theorem states in this case that such an equi- 
librium exists whenever a budgetary rule known as Walras law - it is forbid- 
den to spend more monetary units than earned - is obeyed by consumer's 
demand functions: 
V i = l ,  ... n, Vp, (p ,d i (z , r ) )<r  
In other words, if the demand functions obey the Walras law, there exists 
a t  least a solution p to the allocation problem 
Such a solution p is called a Walrasian equilibrium. 
Example The classical example of a Walrasian demand function is the one 
which is derived from the maximization of a consumer's utility function under the 
budgetary constraint (p, z) 5 r, in such a way that the Walraa law is automati- 
cally satisfied. When a unique solution to such an optimization problem exists, it 
provides an example of a demand function satisfying the Walras law. If several m 
lutions do exist, one has to extend the problem to the case when demand functions 
are replaced by set-valued demand maps. 
But why did Walras call it an equilibrium ? He had in mind an un- 
derlying dynamical process regulating the evolution of prices for which the 
solution p of the above problem is an equilibrium in the mechanical sense, 
i.e., for which p is a constant evolution. F'urthermore, if the solution p(t) 
of this dynamical system converges t o  some value p, then this asymptotic 
price is an equilibrium. Therefore, such dynamical process can be regarded 
as a (continuous) algorithm to  obtain an equilibrium: YVoyons ci prisent 
wmment ce mZme pmbldme de l'ichange de plusieurs manchandises en te  
elles, dont nous venom de tmuver la solution scientifique, est aussi celui 
qui se rtsout empin'quement sur le manchi par le micanisme de la wncur- 
rence... Cela se fait aprts rtflezion, sans calcul, mais ezactement comme 
cela se fernit par le calcul en vertu du systtme des iquations d'iquivalence 
des quantitb demandies et offertes et de la satisfaction mazima wmpliti  
par les restn'ctions convenues. ... Que faut-il donc pmuver pour ttablir que 
la solution thwrique et la solution du mancht! sont identiques ? Tout simple- 
ment que la hausse ou la lmisse sont un mode de risolution par tiitonnement 
du systdme des iquations d'igaliti de l'offe et de la demande. ", he wrote in 
the twelfth lecture of his E L ~ M E N T S  D'ECONOMIE T H ~ O R I Q U E .  
In our framework, the "systdme des iquations d'igaliti de l'offe et de 
la demande" is described by the excess demand map E associating with any 
price p the difference 
n 
between the total demand C di(p, r;(p)) and the total supply (the set M of 
i=l 
scarce resources). 
The Walrasian tStonnement8, in its continuous version, is defined by the 
differential inclusion 
~ ' ( 1 )  E E(P(~) )  
Hence, according to  this law of supply and demand, the price increases 
whenever the excess demand is positive and decreases in the opposite case. 
Furthermore, a Walrasian equilibrium price p is indeed an equilibrium 
of this underlying dynamical process because 
0 E 
'Titonnement means 'tentative processw, 'trial and errorw - literally, cumbersomely 
walking in obscurity by touch (titer). The translation of the verbal description by Walrirs 
into the framework of differential equations has been made by Kenneth Arrow and L k n  
Hurwicz. 
We observe that if p(t) is a price supplied by the Walras tfitonnement 
process and if it is not an equilibrium, it cannot be implemented because the 
n 
associated total demand di(p, ri(p)) is not necessarily available. 
i.= 1 
Hence, this model forb~ds consumers to transact as long as the prices are not 
- 
equilibria. It is as if there was a super auctioneer calling prices and receiving 
offers from consumers. If the offers do not match, he calls another price 
according to  the above dynamical process, but does not allow transactions to 
take place as long as the offers are not consistent, and this happens only a t  
equilibrium!. 
TStonnement is therefore not viable. 
But the question which was asked despite this drawback is the conver- 
gence of solutions p(t) of the above tiitonnernent process to  a limit, which 
then is an equilibrium. This issue, as well as either the Lyapunov stabilityg 
or the asymptotic stability1° of a Walrasian equilibrium, require the use 
of adequate Lyapunov functions (introduced by Lyapunov in 1892) which 
decrease along the price paths p(t) in such a way that one can derive the 
convergence of p(t) when t goes to  infinity. For example, an excess demand 
satisfying the property 
is shown t o  converge to  an equilibrium". It had been difficult to  provide 
'This means that for any neighborhood of the equilibrium, there exists a smaller neigh- 
borhood from which the solutions remain in the given neighborhood. 
''The means that  there exists a subset, called the basin of attraction, from which the 
solutions converge to  the equilibrium. 
"Each differentiable Lyapunov function p H V(p) entails a condition on the excess 
demand map because the property 
holds for any price path if and only if 
1 The function V(p) := ;;lip - 111' provides the above condition. Another (nondifferentiable) 
1 
Lyapunov function proposed in the economic literature has been V(p) := max E .  (Lya- 
i=l,  ... n 
punov method can be extended to  any lower semicontinuous function!) Observe however 
a satisfying economic interpretation to  such additional assumptions (to the 
Walras law). Furthermore, Scarf proposed in 1960 an example of excess 
demand function for which there exists a unique equilibrium which basin of 
attraction is empty. Hence, convergence of the Walras titonnement holds 
only for restrictive classes of titonnement processes. 
On the other hand, Debreu, Mantel, Sonnenschein, among many others, 
showed that any continuous function can be regarded as an excess demand 
function for some underlying Walrasian economic model, destroying the hope 
that every possible tStonnement process should converge to  an equilibrium. 
Finally, it may be too much to ask the entity which regulates the price 
(the market, the invisible hand, the Gosplan, ...) to  behave as a real decision- 
maker whereas consumers act passively according to  their demand functions. 
For these reasons, and also because these issues are treated in depth in 
may other books and papers, we shall let aside the Walrasian titonnement, 
the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium and the asymptotic theorems. 
However, the legitimate admiration that L b n  Walras deserves should 
not imply a dogmatic respect of his contribution by his followers: the equi- 
librium concept was a simplifying step in the attempt to  grasp some essential 
economic feature in an otherwise complex maze of concepts. This concept 
had its use, as a first approximation, despite the fact that it rarely happened 
in economic history. The Walrasian titonnement still keeps its attractive- 
ness among some economists despite its failure to  explain the achievement 
of a (viable) allocation, let it be an equilibrium. 
So, its dipassement, as well as the observation that the Walrasian titon- 
nement is not viable and should be replaced by a viable dynamical system, 
should not be regarded by the faithful6 as a crime of lise majesti. On the 
other hand, these shortcomings should not be used to claim that any decen- 
tralized mechanism using prices is merely a fantasy dreamed by theoreticians 
from their ivory towers - an "empty boxn, as it has been written - and 
even, to reject the relevance of mathematical metaphors in economics12. 
that for any desired Lyapunov function V ,  a modified titonnement of the form 
satisfies t  w V(p( t ) )  doea not increane under the nsud Wdras law. 
"This is a typical instance of impatience and the totalitarian desire for monist 
explanations. 
2.4 Nontiitonnement Models 
Since the Walrasian tstonnement is not viable, many authors proposed nont3- 
tonnement dynamical processes (in particular, Arrow-Hahn, Negishi, Smale, 
Uzawa, among many others). 
Here, both the consumers act on their consumptions and Adam Smith's 
invisible hand act on the prices, according to  a system of differential equa- 
tions of the form 
Second, this dynamical system must yield viable solutions, in such a 
way that a t  each instant, consumers may transact and consume available 
resources. 
In such models, the price dynamics described by g is regarded as a supply 
and demand law, assumed to  describe how the invisible hand governs the 
evolution 
But, in order t o  keep the consumptions viable, the Nagumo theorem 
requires t o  assume conditions on the rules f; which: 
1. guarantee the viability for all prices, so that such nontitonnement models 
can no longer provide explanations of the role of prices in decentraliza- 
tion mechanisms, 
2. and are not decentralized because the maps f; have to  depend upon the 
consumptions of the other consumers. 
These requirements can be regarded as 'rationing" conditions imposed on 
the consumers for respecting the scarcity conditions, providing "nonprice" 
decentralization mechanisms. 
Actually, the issues studied by the students of nontitonnement mecha- 
nisms is the asymptotic convergence of the solutions t o  Pareto optimal allo- 
cations (which are Walrasian equilibria for adequate allocations of the total 
income). 
One naturally may add to  the price mechanism any 'rationing" mech- 
anism, which is valid any time that decentralization by prices only is not 
possible. But before complying to  that strategy, one may ask whether this is 
due to  the fact that the supply and demand law described by the dynamics 
g is imposed a priori independently of the behavior of the consumers and 
the set M of scarce resources. We shall attempt to answer positively this 
question by characterizing the family of supply and demand laws which are 
consistent with the behavior of the consumers and the set of scarce resources. 
In other words, to answer the questions whether one can find price dynamics 
g(zl,. . . , z,, p) which can regulate the evolution of prices in such a way that 
visible consumers modify continuously their consumption in a decentralized 
way. 
2.5 Visible Consumers and Viable Processes 
We suggest to go a step further from the Walrasian titonnement by 
1. conserving the dynamic (active) behavior of consumers as in nonti- 
tonnement models, but in a decentralized way, 
2. abandoning any a priori supply and demand rule regulating the evo- 
lution of prices. 
In other words, instead o f  taking a supply and demand rule as a primitive 
o f  the model as it is done in both tttonnement and nontttonnement models, we 
shall derive them (and compute them) from the knowledge o f  the decentralized 
dynamics describing the behavior o f  the consumers and the knowledge o f  the 
set M o f  scarce resources. 
It may be wise indeed to let the real decision-makers, the consumers in 
our case, to govern the evolution of their consumption through differential 
equations 
4 ( t )  = c;(z;(t),P(t)) 
parametrized (or controlled) by the price p(t), so that consumers change 
their consumptions knowing only the price p(t) a t  each time t, without taking 
into account neither the behavior o f  the other consumers nor the knowledge of  
the set M o f  scarce resources. 
Hence, a consumer is an economic agent, whose dynamical behavior is 
described by the function (z, p) I+ c;(z, p), called change function13. 
Hence i t  shares with the Walrasian static model its decentralization prop- 
erty. 
The problem is then to find a time-dependent price p(t) such that the as- 
sociated solutions z;(t) o f  the above differential equations do form an allocation 
- 
130nce can associate with any change function ci a demand (set-valued) map Di defined 
by z E Di(p) if and only if c ~ ( z ,  p) = 0 
Table 1: Comparison between Walrasian tiitonnement and viable process 
Process: 
Description of 
the behavior of 
consumers 
Derivation 
from utility 
function 
Equilibrium: 
stationarity and 
(static) viability 
Budget rule 
(dynamic) 
Viability 
Characterization 
of the viability 
Regulation law 
Supply and Demand 
Walrasian 
demand functions 
di(z, r ) 
xi = &(xi, ri(P)) 
di (P,  r ) 
maximizes Ui under 
(P ,  z )  l r 
V i ,  %i = di(zi, ri(p)) 
such that 
n C C E M  
i=l 
(P,di(z, P I )  r 
n 
d ( t )  E C  di(p(t)) - M 
i=l 
Viable 
change functions 
~ ( z i ,  P )  
z:( t)  = ci(zi(t),  ~ ( t ) )  
ci(z, P)  
= U;I(z) - p 
= a (u i l (p , z )<r)  ( z )  
V i,  ci(%;,P) = 0 
such that 
n Chi E M 
i=l 
(P ,  ci(z, P ) )  < 0 
3 p(t) such that 
n C  zi( t)  E M 
- 
v ( z l , - - . , z n ) ,  
n ~ ( z l , . . . , z n )  # 0 
~ ( t )  E n ~ ( z l ( t ) ,  - , zn ( t ) )  
~. 
# ( t )  E Gw(z i ( t ) ,  . - 9  zn(t) ,  ~ ( t ) )  
at each time t: 
n 
We prove that this viability property holds true under a budget rule 
which is a dynamical version of the static Walras law. We shall even prove 
under the same assumption the existence of a viable equilibrium (31,. . . , Z,, p) 
of this dynamical system, which is a solution to 
Example As in classical Walrasian economies, one can derive change func- 
tions from the consumer's wish to increase its utility under the budgetary constraint 
(p ,  2 )  5 r. The idea then is to use the steepest ascent method to the restriction of 
the utility function U to  the budget set (which is no longer differentiable). Using 
nonsmooth analysis, i.e., replacing gradients by generalized gradients, we may take 
(when the utility function Ui is assumed to be differentiable. Otherwise, one can 
take the generalized gradient of Ui, and obtain a set-valued change map. We 
thus have to  replace differential equations by differential inclusions to  describe the 
behavior of consumers, and this is possible.) 
Actually, under adequate convexity assumptions, the static maximization mech- 
n 
anism: Find an allocation 5 = ( i l  , . . . , .) such that Xii E M and 
i=l 
C ~ ~ ( 4 )  = max C u i ( q )  
i=l C:=l z ' ~ M  i=l 
providing Pareteoptimal allocations conceals the three kind of algorithms: a Wal- 
rasian tGtonnement, a nontatonnement process and a viable one. Indeed, convex 
analysis provides three characterizations of such an optimal solutions (51,. . . , i n )  
and its Lagrange multiplier p: 
n 
1. ( i l l . .  ., i n )  maximizes the restriction of the function Ui to  the set of 
i=l 
allocations 
2. p minimizes the dual problem 
3. ( i l l  . . . , i n ,  P) is a saddle point of the associated Lagrangian 
The (generalized) gradient method of each of the above problems are 
1. a viable process 
z:(t) = U,!(z(t)) - p(t) 
where 
~ ( t )  E N ~ ( z l ( t ) ,  ...,zn(t)) 
2. a nontitonnement process of the form 
zi(t) = Ui'(z(t)) - p(t) 
where 
n 
PI(,) E C z i ( t ) - S ~ ( P ( t ) )  
i=l 
(where the supply map SM associates with any price p the set of resources 
yielding the maximal income) 
3. a Walrasian titonnement process 
where E(p) = Cy=, Di(p) -SM(P) is the excess demand when Di(p) denotes 
the demand map derived from the utility function. 
The Crandall-Pazy theorem implies the existence of solutions to each one of 
these three mechanisms (since those three dynamics are maximal monotone) and 
the convergence of both the viable process and the Walrasian titonnement, since 
the dynamics are (generalized) gradient methods. This provides at least instances 
where the Walras titonnement converges, offering positive examples countering 
Scarf's counter-example. 0 
Actually, we shall prove that the budgetary rule is just a sufficient con- 
dition, easy to  implement for the viability of such a decentralized dynamical 
system and the existence of an equilibrium. 
The viability theorem allows us t o  characterize the above viability prop- 
erty in terms of a pricing map llM associating with any allocation (z l , .  . . , z,) 
a subset IIM(zl,. . . , z,) of prices. This pricing map is built from the knowl- 
edge of M and the change functions c; of the consumers. 
The basic viability theorem implies that the above dynamical system is t i -  
able if and only if for any allocation (21,. . . ,z,), the subset IIM(zl,. . ., 2,) 
is not empty. In this case, the ezistence of an equilibrium is also guamnteed. 
Furthermore, the prices which govern the evolution of allocations evolve 
according the (set-valued) "regulation law" 
The above law provides a t  each instant the set of "viable" prices which 
govern the evolution of allocations of scarce resources, stating a posteriori 
how the invisible hand should choose the prices (such prices can be regarded 
as "open loop" controls in the terminology of systems theory). 
Once this has been established, one can raise other questions. For in- 
stance, whether the allocations (zl(t), . . . , zn(t)) converges asymptotically 
to  a limit (Z1,. . ., Zn), which is then an allocation. Whether this conver- 
gence is a t  each instant Pareto-improving. This can be solved, each further 
demand bridling the initial regulation map IIM, replacing it by a smaller 
one which associates the set of prices p(t) providing allocations satisfying 
these supplementary demands. 
3 Deriving Decentralizing Supply and Demand 
Laws 
The above regulation law is not yet a "supply and demand" law, because it 
does not tell how the velocities of prices vary. By supply and demand law, 
we mean here a dynamical process of the form 
as in nontttonnement models14. 
Naturally, if the pricing map IIM = nM were actually single-valued and 
differentiable, the chain rule allows us to  derive from the regulation law 
V t, ~ ( t )  = ~ ~ ( z l ( t ) ,  zn(t)) 
the law 
which can be regarded as a supply and demand law. For such a law, the 
nontitonnement system 
''for which we do not require a priori that price goes up when demand exceeds snpply. 
One can not exclude that, for certain economies where the set M of resources is not a 
prodnd, pricea of certain commodities interfere with the modification of pricea of other 
commodities in order to maintain continnous transactione (the viability condition). 
yields a t  each instant allocations of scarce resources (in a decentralized way). 
When the pricing map is set-valued, the differential calculus of set-valued 
maps1= allows also t o  differentiate the regulation law. It is possible t o  de- 
fine a concept of derivative of set-valued maps, called contingent derivative. 
Denote by I Ih(z l , .  . . , zn,p) the contingent derivative of the pricing map1= 
IIM a t  a point (21,. . . , zn,p)  of its graph, which is still a set-valued map 
associating with marginal commodities (vl, . . . , vn) a set 
of marginal prices. 
From now on, we shall set 
One can prove a 'set-valued chain rulen which allows to  differentiate the 
regulation law and yields 
We shall regard this differential inclusion as a 'Supply and Demand 
Mapn specifically designed to  guarantee the viability of the decentralized 
nontiitonnement mechanism 
The set-valued map GM(zl,. . . , zn,p) is a kind of envelope of all single- 
valued supply and demand maps g(zl, . . . , zn,p)  for which the decentralized 
nont4tonnernent process 
provides a t  each instant viable allocations of scarce resources. 
15which was motivated by this very problem in the first place. 
16~ctually, we shdl differentiate a "emallern regulation map which governs the evolution 
of almost everywhere differentiable pricea. This a technical issue which is too long to 
expl J n  here. 
In the language of viability theory, such selections g of GM are called 
"dynamical dosed loops". 
The question arises how to  find such selection procedures, and among 
them, to  find the ones which retain some economic meaning. 
We shall now advocate the ones which satisfy the inertia principle. 
4 The Inertia Principle and Heavy Evolutions 
Actually, if the behavior of the consumers is well defined, what about either 
the market or the planning bureau, the task of which is now to  find the prices 
p(t) in IIM(zl(t), . . . , zn(t))? They do not behave as actual decision makers, 
knowing what is good or not (this is the case of even a planning bureau as 
soon as it involves more than three bureaucrats!). Hence, their role is only 
a regulatory one. If they are not able to optimize, we may assume that they 
only are able to  correct the prices when the viability of the economic system 
is at  stake, i.e., when the total consumption is no longer available. 
Hence, we assume that the Adam Smith's "invisible hand" or the plan- 
ning bureau are able to  "pilot" or Yact" on the system by choosing such 
controls according to the inertia principle: 
Keep the price constant as long as the evolution provides allocations of  
available resources, and change them only when the viability is at stakes. 
Indeed, as long as the state of the system lies in the interior of the 
allocation set (the set of states satisfying scarcity constraints), any price will 
work. Therefore, the system can maintain the price inherited from the past. 
This happens if the system obeys the inertia principle. Since the allocations 
may evolve while the price remains constant, the total consumption may 
reach the boundary of the set of scarce resources with an "outward" velocity. 
This event corresponds to  a period of crisis: To survive, the system must find 
another price such that the new associated velocity forces the solution back 
inside the allocation set. Alternatively, if the scarcity constraints can evolve, 
another way t o  resolve the crisis is to  relax the constraints (by technological 
progress, for instance) so that the state of the system lies in the interior of 
the new allocation set. When this is not possible, strategies for structural 
change fail: by design, this means that the solution leaves the allocation set 
and "dies". 
This management by crisis or bankruptcy has been observed in economic 
history, so that we suggest to take these phenomena into account in the 
framework of this Inertia Principle17. Crisis could be defined here as either 
discontinuity of the price evolution or "fast" evolutions of prices. 
The extreme form of the inertia principle leads to the question whether 
one can obtain the evolution of allocations of scarce resources under a con- 
stant price. We shall say that a price p  ^ is a punctuated equilibrium if there 
exists a nonempty subset N ( 3  of allocations, called its viability niche, which 
is viable for a price: 
v (z?, - -920,) E N ( 3 ,  
the solutions to the system 
V i = 1, . . . n, ~ : ( t )  = ci(Zi(t),p^) 
remain in the viability niche N(F)  
One can expect that the viability niches of most of the prices are empty. 
Naturally, when the viability niche of a punctuated equilibrium is reduced to 
an unique allocation, this allocation is an equilibrium. 
Therefore, we have to select "supply and demand" functions (dynamical 
closed loops) g(zl, . . . , zn, p) which obey the inertia principle, thus providing 
rules for choosing prices when viability 
is at stakes in order to obtain allocations of scarce resources. 
The simplest one (and most often, the most reasonable one) is to assume 
that at each instant, the prices are changed as slowly as possible. This is 
obtained by taking for map g the map WM defined by: 
~ ~ ( 2 1 , .  . .  ~ n , p )  E I I h ( w ~ ( z 1 , .  - 9  zn,p))(cl(zl,P), . . .,cn(zn,P)) 
is the element of minimal norm in 
I I L ( W M ( ~ I ,  - , ~ ~ , P ) ) ( c I ( ~ I , P ) ,  --,cn(zn,P)) 
"This Inertia Principle provides an explanation of the concept punctuated equilibrium 
introduced in 1972 by Elredge and Gould in paleontology. Excavations at  Kenya's Lake 
Tnrkana have provided clear evidence of evolution from one species to  another. The rock 
strata there contain a series of fossils that show every small step of an evolution journey 
that e m s  to have proceeded in fib and starts. Examination of more than 3,000 foseils 
by P. W i a m m n  showed how 13 species evolved. The record indicated that the animals 
stayed much the same for immensely long stretches of time. But twice, about two million 
years ago and then, 700,000 years ago, the pool of life seemed to explode - set off, 
appuently, by a drop in the lake's water level. Intermediate forms appeared very quickly, 
new species evolving in 5,000 to  50,000 years, after millions of years of constancy, leading 
paleontologists to  challenge the accepted idea of continuous evolution. 
It obviously satisfies the inertia principle because if the velocity 0 of the 
price is available, it is picked by such a selection procedure, so that the price 
remains constant as long as 0 belongs to GM(zl(t), . . . , z,(t),p(t)). 
Evolutions obeying this specific choice are called "heavy18 evolutions", 
in the sense of heavy trends. Hence heavy evolution is obtained by requiring 
at each instant the (norm of the) velocity of the price to be as small as 
possible. 
Heavy solutions enjoy the property of "locking-in" punctuated equilibria. 
Indeed, assume that for some instant tf > 0, p(tf) is a punctuated equi- 
librium, then p(t) = pt, for all t 2 tf and thus, (zl(t), . . . , z,(t)) remains 
forever in the viability niche of this punctuated equilibrium (and thus, an 
allocation of scarce resources). 
Therefore, for implementing this inertia principle, we have to provide 
conditions under which relevant prices p(.) are differentiable (almost ev- 
erywhere), to built the differential inclusion which governs the evolution of 
differentiable relevant prices and then, select a differential equation in this 
differential inclusion (called a "dynamical closed loop") which will obey the 
inertia principle. 
In summary, given the decentralized behavior of the consumers described 
by the differential equations zi = ci(zi,p) and the set of  scarce resources, we 
can built the dynamics WM governing the behavior of the market, so that the 
evolution of the economic system is described by the system of differential 
equations 
i) zI(t) = c;(z;(t), p(t)) (i = 1, . . . , n) 
ii) ~ ' ( 0  = WM(Z(~),P(~))  
Contrary to nontitonnement models, this law governing the evolution of 
prices is not a modeling assumption, but a consequence of the modeling 
data of this elementary model satisfying the inertia principle. 
In summary, we assume implicitly that the "invisible hand" follows 
an "opportunistic" and "conservative" behavior of the system: a behav- 
ior which enables the system to allocate scarce resources among consumers 
as long as any price makes possible its regulation and to keep this price as 
long as it is possible. 
"This is justified by the fact that the velocity of the price is related to the acceleration 
of the consumptions, which, being minimal, has the maximal inertia. 
We then attempt to explain the evolution of allocations and prices and 
to reveal the concealed feedbacks which allow the system to be regulated by 
prices. 
5 Planning Procedures 
Another way to find prices satisfying the regulation law is to obtain them 
by planning procedures. 
This means that the planning bureau has to associate with any allocation 
(21,. . . ,zn)  a price r ( z l , .  . . ,zn) which it sends back to the consumer. 
The viability theorem states that whenever the map 
is a selection of the pricing map IIM in the sense that 
then the evolution of consumption according 
yields allocations of scarce resources. 
Planning procedures introduced by Drkze, de la Vallk-Poussin, Mal- 
invaud, etc. fall in this category, and can be interpreted as closed loop 
controls. 
One can obtain such selection by static optimization techniques (or, more 
generally, by game theoretical methods, or any other kind of technique). For 
instance, we can choose the element nO(z) E II(z) of minimal norm. Despite 
the lack of continuity of such a selection, we still can prove that the system 
of differential equations 
has viable solutions, which are called 'slow allocations". However, this 
type of selection may not enjoy economic meaning, contrary to the heavy 
allocations we proposed earlier. 
These selection procedures are myopic contrary to intertemporal opti- 
mization mechanisms. 
Indeed, in the dynarnical case, selection procedures split in two cate- 
gories: we have to  distinguish between "intertemporal optimizationn prob- 
lems and "myopic or instantaneous optimizationn problems. 
In intertemporal optimization, we maximize intertemporal utility func- 
tions of the form 
under the constraint (z(.), p(.)) E Graph(I1). 
These are questions with which Calculus of Variations and Optimal Con- 
trol Theory deal with. 
But Optimal Control Theory does require Adam Smith's invisible hand to  
"guiden the system by optimizing such an intertemporal optimality criterion, 
the choice of which is open to question even in static models, even when 
multicriteria or several decision makers are involved in the model. 
Furthermore, the choice (even conditional) of the controls is made once 
and for all a t  some initial time, so that they cannot be modified at each 
instant so as to take into account possible modifications of the environment of 
the system, forbidding therefore adaptation to scarcity constraints. 
Finally, intertemporal optimization viability theory does require knowledge 
of the future (even of a stochastic nature.) This requires the possibility of 
experimentation or the belief that the phenomenon under study is periodic. 
Experimentation, by assuming that the evolution of the state of the system 
starting from a given initial state for a same period of time will be the same 
whatever the initial time, allows one to translate the time interval back and 
forth, and, thus, to  "known the future evolution of the system. 
But in economics, as well as in biological evolution, experimentation is 
not possiblelg. Furthermore, the dynamics of the system disappear and cannot 
be recreated. Most economic systems do involve myopic behavior; while they 
cannot take into account the future, they are certainly constrained by the 
past. 
Hence, forecasting or prediction of the future are not the issues which we 
shall address here. La pre'vision est un rZve duquel l'e've'nement nous tire, 
wrote Paul ValCry. 
"The twentieth century Soviet type (or military type) economic experimentation 
showed experimentally the limits of centralized operation of complex systems. 
Therefore, instead of using intertemporal ~ p t i m i z a t i o n ~ ~  that involves 
the future, we shall advocate here myopic selection procedures, either by 
dynamical closed loops (supply and demand maps) or by closed loop prices 
(planning procedures), for providing selection procedures of viable evolutions 
obeying, a t  each instant, scarcity or more generally, viability constraints 
which depend upon the present or the past. (This does not exclude antici- 
pations, which are extrapolations of past evolutions, constraining in the last 
analysis the evolution of the system to  be a function of its history.) 
Viability theory deals with "dynamics under constraintsn, playing the 
role of "optimization under constraintsn or "existence of equilibrium un- 
der constraintsn in a dynamical manner. The viability theorem, which is 
an extension of Nagumo's theorem to  differential inclusions, actually plays 
the role of Lagrange's or Kuhn-Tucker's theorem. Both use the concept of 
tangent cones t o  "differentiaten the constraints, so t o  speak, and by duality, 
involve the concepts of normal cones t o  the constraints, allowing the dual in- 
terpretation by prices and "budgetaryn conditions t o  pop up to  complement 
conditions bearing on physical commodities. In the same way than optimiza- 
tion under constraints is much more difficult t o  handle than optimization 
without constraints, viability theory raises more obstacles t o  overcome than 
the study of ordinary systems of differential equations. In some operational 
sense, the basic viability theorem can replace the Kakutani fixed point the- 
orem each time it is used in a static model t o  make it  "dynamical". This 
is the strategy which we have tried to  explain in the case of the problem of 
decentralized dynamical allocation of resources. 
''which can be traced back to Sumerian mythology which is at the origin of Genesis: 
one Decision-Maker, deciding what is good and bad and choosing the best (fortunately, on 
an intertemporal basis, thus wisely postponing to eternity the verification of optimality), 
knowing the future, and having taken the optimd decieions, well, during one week ... 
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